and deport aliens from any country deemed "dangerous to the country" without affording them due process of law. 1 After the riots and criminal attacks on prominent public figures that took place subsequent to the end of World War I, the government ordered various raids directed at deporting aliens who sympathized with anarchist or communist ideals. 2 In the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps with the alleged purpose of guaranteeing national security. 3 As part of a sweeping government effort to quell terrorism after 9/11, President Bush signed an executive order allowing special military tribunals to try foreigners suspected of committing such acts. 4 As a result, the military facilities at Guantánamo Bay are being primarily used as prisons for the indefinite detention of non-citizens designated by President Bush as "enemy combatants." All of these governmental acts have one thing in common: they distinguish between "us" and "them," "good guys" and "bad guys," "friends" and "enemies," "insiders" and "outsiders." Near the end of the 18 th century, aliens (outsiders) enjoyed less constitutional freedoms than citizens (insiders). After Pearl Harbor, United States law distinguished between the Japanese people (them) and the American people (us). Today, in the post 9/11 world, those associated to so-called "fundamentalist Islam" (bad guys) are treated differently than those who are supposedly willing to defend freedom (good guys). In light of these examples, it is hard to deny that there has always existed, and still exists, an American legal discourse of exclusion. This discourse of exclusion has been repeatedly used to legitimate the adoption of measures that target certain groups of people primarily on the basis of their status as members of a particular class. Those who have been the focus of these measures have, despite their presence in the country, experienced what it feels like to be an outsider looking in.
The existence of this legal discourse of exclusion raises various important queries. What are the philosophical and historical roots of the governmental tendency to inequitably target certain groups of people as a way to safeguard the rest of the populace? Why is it that the State Outsiders Looking In typically makes use of discourses of exclusion in order to handle emergency situations, such as the turbulent riots that broke out in the United States after World War I or the frightening period that resulted after the attacks on the World Trade Center?
Is it judicious for government to disproportionately burden certain groups of the population when the security of the nation is at stake? The purpose of this article is to explore these fundamental problems. I will do so in four steps.
In Part I, I will examine the political philosophy of various prominent European and American thinkers in order to explain why discourses of exclusion seem to lie at the heart of social contract theories of the State. This might explicate why governments have always been seduced by the idea that it might be legitimate to safeguard the rights of some (the non-excluded) at the expense of the rights of others (the excluded).
The next part will be dedicated to briefly recounting several instances in which the government of the United States has placed unfair burdens on some groups of people in order to guarantee the safety of the rest of the population. I will focus on four cases, namely: the curtailing of the free speech rights of aliens during the Quasi-War of 1798, the persecution of political dissidents after both world wars, the branding of Japanese Americans as an "enemy race" that needed to be contained in order to avoid another Pearl Harbor, and the recurrent attempt to treat suspected terrorists differently depending on whether or not they are American citizens. This historical inquiry will reveal that the United States government has continuously engaged in the practice of inequitably burdening certain groups of people during times of actual or perceived emergency.
In Part III I will attempt to demonstrate that the State cannot legitimate the use of an official discourse of exclusion by pointing to the existence of a state of emergency. Even if one accepts that the government can justifiably impose significant burdens on the population during times of emergency, it does not follow that it can do so in an inequitable manner.
Besides the fact that enacting measures that target certain groups of people is constitutionally suspect on various grounds, 5 the benefits of making use Outsiders Looking In 7 5 Measures targeting groups of people on the basis of their political ideals may contravene the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and association. See U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) . If, on the other hand, the measure allows the government to search or detain the actor solely because he is a member of particular class, the measure could violate the Fourth Amendment, since it would allow the seizure or search of the person on the basis of his status and not on the constitutionally accepted ground of probable cause or, at the very least, reasonable suspicion.
Measures that purport to punish otherwise non-criminal conduct or to aggravate the punishment of conduct that is already considered criminal exclusively because the actor's status are also problematic. This would contradict the basic tenet that people should be punished for engaging in wrongful acts, not for being members of a particular class. This seems to run afoul the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) . It should be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court jurisprudence with regard to the constitutionality of criminalizing conduct in view of the status of the alleged perpetrator is muddled, to say the least. See, for example, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). These types of measures could also be void because they unconstitutionally establish guilt by association alone. See Robel, supra. of such measures do not outweigh the costs. The short-term profits seem to be offset by the fact that trading their liberties for our wellbeing will render us less safe in the long run. Even though these types of measures might help prevent attacks against our nation in the near future, they may also undermine our legitimacy both here and abroad. Ultimately this has the potential of increasing our vulnerability because it will most likely diminish cooperation from those who will probably be in a better position to furnish us with valuable information about possible attacks against our nation. 6
Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss the potential perils of attempting to inequitably target certain groups during times of emergency by examining and critiquing the recent enactment of a statute 7 that authorizes the construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what its proponents have suggested, this measure, which asymmetrically requires Mexicans to assume a burden that is not imposed on our neighbors to the north, will likely augment the risks of a future terrorist attack, not reduce them. aliens are included within the protection afforded by the provision. 19 As usual, Justice Scalia grounded his position on an originalist reading of the Constitution. Even though at first glance there seems to be no clear connection between originalism and contractarianism, it turns out that, upon closer inspection, contractarianism is linked to most originalist theories of interpretation. Since social contract theory "seems to have informed our Nation's founders," 20 any philosophy of constitutional adjudication that purports to appeal to the meaning of the text at the time of the founding will be underpinned by contractarian understandings of the obligations that the State owes to citizens and non-citizens. 21 Once it is accepted that social contract theories can serve to legitimize the practice of discriminating between citizens and aliens, it is not difficult to imagine how these theories can also lead to justifying the practice of inequitably targeting a group of people even though they are citizens. Although citizens have a prima facie right to share whatever benefits might be afforded to people who are insiders to the compact upon which societal life was erected, they may lose this right if they can be linked in some way to those who are not bound by the social-contract. 22 History has not been kind to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
I. DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION AND CONTRACTARIANISM
President Jefferson, whose Republican Party ousted the Federalists from power in the election of 1800, believed that the laws were unconstitutional and did not renew the Alien Friends Act after it expired in 1800. The Sedition Act was also allowed to expire. 30 beginning of a sorry chapter in American law and politics in which specific groups of people have been forced into the status of outsiders looking in.
By branding French aliens and their American sympathizers as members of an enemy class whose civil liberties could be curtailed in order to protect the peace and security of the rest of the populace, the government paved the way for the enactment of future statutes that legitimized measures that inequitably target certain people in the name of national security. It should thus come as no surprise that with the advent of World War I, the United
States again resorted to a discourse of exclusion in an attempt to protect the country from internal and external threats.
RUSSIAN ALIENS AS OUTSIDERS -THE PALMER RAIDS
Less than a year after the cessation of World War I hostilities,
an elaborate scheme to mail 36 bombs to well-known statesmen and politicians was exposed. As a result of this investigation, ten Hollywood screenwriters were sentenced to between six and twelve months in prison for refusing to answer the Committee's questions about their political affiliations and alleged ties with the Communist Party. 46 The "Hollywood Ten," as they would come to be called, claimed that they possessed a First Amendment Americans finally had a taste of how it felt to be an outsider looking in. 
RACIAL GROUPS AS OUTSIDERS-THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT CAMPS

C. ALIENS (MOSTLY MUSLIM) AS OUTSIDERS -GUANTÁNAMO BAY AND THE WAR ON TERROR
September 11, 2001 changed the way Americans look at the world. Airplanes and subways don't seem to be as safe as we once thought they were. We are now willing to tolerate increased security measures at airports and train stations in order to minimize the possibility of being the victim of another attack. The attacks on the Twin Towers also changed the way that the government looks at things. New tools are thought to be needed in order to wage the war on terrorism. One of the government's weapons of choice in this new war is instituting programs that curtail the rights of aliens in an effort to gain intelligence that might prove to be crucial As we can see, history has a tendency to repeat itself. More than two hundred years ago, the American government unfairly targeted French aliens with the alleged purpose of guaranteeing the security of the rest of the populace. Today we are targeting Muslim aliens in much the same manner for what essentially seem to be the same reasons.
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D. AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION -PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
This brief historical recount reveals that government has typically targeted groups of people in an inequitable manner as a way of attempting to neutralize what at the time appeared to be significant threats to the social order. It is difficult to explain why the government has repeatedly decided to act in this way when it is perceived that our national security is threatened. While racism 61 and xenophobia 62 can partially account for some of the measures that have been discussed here, there seems to be an even more fundamental explanation for these events. Governmental authorities appear to believe that engaging in these types of acts during times of crisis can somehow make us safer. If this is the case, various queries require our attention. The most fundamental of these is determining whether it is true that engaging in such practices actually maximizes our security. It is to this question that I now turn.
III. THE PERILS OF UNFAIRLY TARGETING SOME GROUPS OF PEOPLE IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE REST OF THE POPULACE
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
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Outsiders Looking In 61 Against the Japansese during WWII, for example. 62 Against French aliens during the Quasi War of 1798 and against Russian aliens during the period after WWI, for example. Xenophobia may also partially explain the measures recently taken against Muslims in the post 9/11 era.
Given that government tends to gravitate towards the inequitable targeting of allegedly dangerous groups of people during times of crisis, it seems logical to ask whether doing so really helps us to successfully secure our nation. In this section it will be argued that, contrary to what has traditionally been contended by our government, engaging in these discriminatory practices is misguided because the benefits of making use of such practices have not been proven to outweigh the costs of implementing them. For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the objective of targeting some people in order to protect the rights of many is to secure the continued existence of the State by preventing extremely harmful attacks from being carried out and not to further racist agendas. 63 Furthermore, I will avoid delving into the constitutional questions that engaging in such acts raises because those who have advocated its use clearly believe that there is a law of necessity that trumps the provisions of the Constitution that might be nominally infringed during times of national Outsiders Looking In 29 emergency. 64 Thus, in an effort to engage in a fruitful exchange with those who believe that employing the insider/outsider distinction is sometimes an indispensable tool in the fight to secure our nation in moments of crisis, I will steer clear of deontological arguments based on the inviolability of certain constitutional rights and will focus on advancing consequentialist arguments that show that unfairly burdening some groups of people as a mechanism for maximizing the security of those not burdened by the measures is unwise.
B. THE REINFORCED BELIEFS ARGUMENT
One of the major drawbacks of excluding some groups from having access to the full protection of our laws as a way to protect the security of the rest of the population is that the strategy can backfire because of what I call the "reinforced beliefs argument." In the context of terrorism, the argument can be summed up in the following manner:
( people) that they consider to be acting immorally or unjustifiably.
(2) When the country that is threatened by the possibility of an attack resorts to measures that inequitably target certain groups of people it reinforces the terrorists' beliefs that the country they purport to attack acts in an immoral manner.
(3) Thus, requiring that a particular group of people carry a greater burden than the rest of the populace might lead to an increase of attacks because it strengthens the convictions of terrorists' regarding the immorality of the State that they purport to attack.
The recent American experience with terrorism lends credence to the validity of the first premise of the reinforced beliefs argument. It is common knowledge that Al-Qaeda "motivate[s] their members through claims that the West has socially, economically and politically humiliated Islamic society." 65 This leads members of the organization to believe that killing innocent civilians in these western countries, particularly the United States, is morally justified because these innocent civilians are in some way associated with the allegedly humiliating acts that their country has Outsiders Looking In 31 performed. It also seems to be true that this belief is usually the product of deeply held political and/or religious convictions that are not easily manipulated or changed.
As a result of this, it seems fair to conclude, as is posited in the second premise of the argument, that targeting foreigners (especially Muslim aliens) by restricting their liberties more than the rest of the can be seen as a form of "negative advertising" that may have reshaped terrorist preferences toward more terrorism") provide some individuals who previously had no intention of attacking our country with new reasons to believe that the use of force against our nation is morally justifiable. 67
C. THE SUBSTITUTION ARGUMENT
Adopting measures that target some groups of people to the exclusion of others presents a further problem which can be illustrated by what I call the "substitution argument". In a nutshell, the substitution argument holds that restricting the liberties of some during times of national emergency does not make us safer because those intent on harming us will readily adapt by looking for people in the non-excluded groups who will help them carry out their plans. The effect of this is that members of the targeted class will be substituted by people who are not being targeted in an attempt to circumvent the precautionary measures undertaken by the country.
The Israeli experience with terrorism lends support to the aforementioned argument. Take, for example, the notorious case of Kozo Okamoto. 68 Okamoto orchestrated a terrorist attack that took place on May The Okamoto case exemplifies a paradigmatic instance of substitution, in which the terrorist PFLP successfully managed to take advantage of the fact that Israeli authorities were focusing their counterterrorism efforts on identifying potentially dangerous Middle Eastern men by encouraging people from a different race than the one being targeted by the authorities to engage in acts of terrorism.
The recent rise of terrorist acts perpetrated by women represents another example of how organizations adopt substitution techniques as a way of frustrating governmental attempts to secure their nation by disproportionately burdening people from a particular demographic group.
In 2002, for example, the world was surprised when it was confirmed that close to 20 women took part in the taking of 700 hostages in a Moscow theater. That same year, the first female suicide bombers appeared in Israel.
The increase in attacks carried out by women is, at least in part, the product of the conscious decision of terrorist organizations to recruit people who are not being targeted by the government in an attempt to sidestep preventive security measures. Hence, as it has been pointed out:
After the attacks of Sept. 11, the security measures introduced at airports, train stations and other public places were geared toward the perpetrators of the hijackings. As all the members of the group around Mohammed Atta were young, male and of Middle Eastern origin (as well as appearance), it was little surprise that this became the prototype at which law enforcement agencies around the world were looking most closely. Terror networks like Al Qaeda were quick to spot this vulnerability, and consequently set out to recruit operatives who did not fit the standard description. 69
The conscious effort made by terrorist networks to employ techniques of substitution as a way to exploit the vulnerabilities of security measures that rely heavily on the targeting of a particular group of people as We're counting on all of them." 70 According to the MTA, the purpose of the ad is to "remind customers of the need to stay aware of their surroundings and to report anything suspicious." 71 Evidently, the point of the message is to stress the fact that cooperation of the city's residents and visitors with local authorities is vital to ensuring security.
It should be noted, however, that such cooperation can only be expected if the people believe that the government is acting in a legitimate manner. Thus, if local law enforcement authorities are perceived to be acting illegitimately, the prospects for cooperation from subway riders diminish. As Professor Strauss has stated, "the characteristic feature of a claim of illegitimacy is the assertion that, as a moral matter, full obedience [to a governmental act] is not required". 72 Thus, obedience to authorities and cooperation with the government decreases as the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement agencies diminishes.
Once one accepts that an increase in the perceived illegitimacy of a government augments the probability that the people will not obey authorities, it is easy to see why adopting measures that inequitably burden some groups of people will probably reduce cooperation of the populace with the State. Selectively targeting a group of people will almost inevitably alienate a substantial portion of the targeted population. This makes us less safe because it diminishes the probability that members of the alienated group will cooperate with the police and other law enforcement agencies in their attempts to prevent attacks. The following example provided by Professors Tyler and Fagan explains this phenomenon:
Thinking that one has been stopped by the police because of one's ethnicity reflects the belief that one has been profiled. This judgment has negative consequences during personal encounters with the police, because it encourages resistance and antagonism, as well as undermining the legitimacy of the police. On the community level, if members of the community believe that profiling is widespread, they are less supportive of the police. These profiling effects emerge because people view profiling as an unfair policing procedure. 73 The pernicious effects of unfairly targeting some social groups as a mechanism for maximizing our security are exacerbated by the fact that the people whose cooperation authorities typically need the most are precisely those who are being targeted. If it is true that those who are being targeted constitute a particularly dangerous group of people, then it should follow that the government should not want to alienate those who are in a particularly privileged position to observe suspicious activity that, if communicated to the police in a timely fashion, might lead to the prevention of attacks on the community.
The abovementioned problem is compounded when one considers that cooperation from other countries, especially Middle Eastern states, which is also essential to our efforts to minimize the occurrence of terrorist attacks in our country, is probably lessened when we make use of the measures that are being critiqued here. The reason for this is that unfairly targeting certain portions of the population breeds anti-American sentiment across the globe, particularly in the countries of origin of those who are targeted the most.
In short, adopting measures during times of crisis that unfairly burden a particular group of people emasculates our legitimacy both domestically and internationally. This will in all probability hinder our efforts to secure our nation because it will undercut local and foreign cooperation with our government.
E. THE PRESUMPTION ARGUMENT
I have chosen to dub the last argument that I will advance against the practice of unfairly targeting certain groups of people during times of emergency "the presumption argument." It can be summarized in the following manner:
(1) Since acts that inequitably burden some groups of people have unquestionable adverse effects on the targeted group, engaging in such acts is presumptively wrong.
(2) Government can justifiably engage in presumptively wrongful conduct if it can demonstrate that the adverse effects of performing the act are offset by the benefits it generates.
(3) An answer to the question about whether the benefits of targeting certain groups of people during times of crisis outweigh the costs is elusive because there is currently no way of meaningfully assigning probabilities to the possible beneficial effects of engaging in such a practice. 74 (4) Thus, the government cannot justify the practice because it has no way of proving that doing so will have a beneficial effect, whereas there is little doubt that doing so will adversely affect the members of the group being targeted. reasons that justify the conduct all things being considered, the failure to provide such reasons should lead to a rejection of the practice. 80
V. THE SECURITY FENCE ACT OF 2006 -A CASE STUDY ON THE PERILS OF THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION
The best way to illustrate the arguments advanced in Part IV against the judiciousness of adopting measures that inequitably target certain groups during times of crisis is by way of a recent example. Less than a
year ago, Congress enacted the Security Fence Act of 2006 (SFA), which authorizes the construction of a 700 mile wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Many lawmakers seem to believe that erecting such a structure will, among other things, minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack because, as U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) has stated, "fences would be a hindrance to terrorists should they decide to come across a land border between the U.S. and Mexico and to California." 81 The SFA has alienated Mexicans and Latinos both here and abroad, who wonder why the government had specifically chosen to target their border even though the border with Canada is three times longer than the one with Mexico.
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Outsiders Looking In 80 Durlauf, supra note 74, p. 6. 81 John Hawkin's telephone interview with Congressman Duncan Hunter. An edited transcript of the interview can be found in http://rightwingnews.com/interviews/ duncanhunter.php.
The absence of a fence with our friends to the north will likely cause our potential attackers to adapt by attempting to enter our country through Canada instead of Mexico. This constitutes a classic example of substitution techniques that might be used by terrorists as a way to get around measures like the SFA. The foolishness of believing that the SFA will lead to a reduction in terrorism is further highlighted by the fact that none of the people who have attempted to commit acts of terrorism in the United States have come through Mexico, whereas at least one entered the country through the Canadian border. 82 Construction of the wall could also end up hurting our national security initiatives, for it will likely lead to a deterioration of U.S-Mexico relations during a time when close collaboration between both countries is critical to waging the war against terror. This fear has been corroborated by the concerns voiced by the two most recent Mexican presidents who have denounced the idea of building a wall to separate the two countries as "shameful," 83 "deplorable," 84 and as a mistake akin to the building of the
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Berlin wall. 85 Breeding such feelings of resentment amongst the Mexican people could undercut our efforts to secure the nation, since it will likely diminish the perceived legitimacy of American strategies to fight terrorism.
If this were to happen, one should expect cooperation of Mexicans and Hispanics with our government to decrease as well. Given that Latinos account for over 15% of the population of the United States, it does not seem like a good idea to enact measures that tend to alienate them. This is especially the case when the benefits of adopting such measures remain unclear.
Since the SFA has both the likelihood of increasing the use of substitution techniques that might encourage potential terrorists to enter the country by crossing the Canadian border and the potential for reducing Hispanic cooperation with law enforcement authorities, it could very well be the case that the law might actually make us less safe. Such is the paradoxical nature of governmental acts that inequitably burden a particular group of people with the alleged purpose of promoting the security of the rest of the population. They tend to achieve exactly the opposite of what was intended by those that promoted their adoption.
CONCLUSION
During the last two hundred years, our government has frequently enacted measures that unfairly burden certain social groups during times of crisis. The historical analysis set forth in Part II of this article reveals that adoption of such measures is usually justified by an appeal to national security. Thus, we have been told that we need to exclude some groups from the full protection of our laws in order to guarantee the safety of the rest of the populace.
I believe that this is a false dichotomy. There is no need to debate whether we should inequitably target certain groups of people as a way to maximize our security because there is no hard evidence tending to prove that doing so will really make us safer. Moreover, it seems that in light of the reinforced beliefs, legitimacy, substitution and presumption arguments advanced in Part IV, there is reason to believe that adopting such laws will make us less secure in the long run.
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